Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Change We Can Believe In

Now that I've got you looking, this isn't going to be about what you think it is. Or, at any rate, not in the way that you may think. But there is, nonetheless, a point behind the title.

A friend of mine just posted an article released by the Agence France-Presse, commenting on an article that appeared in the Financial Times. The article, it appears, was an interview with a Chinese defence official, a Major General of the People's Liberation Army(Navy), in which that individual asserted China's "right" to build an aircraft carrier.

Well, so what? After all, we've got eleven of them, why can't the PRC have a few, too?

Absolutely no reason at all. Any nation has the "right" to do whatever it wants in terms of its military. I would, however, question the why . . . just as I would question the justification and, I might add, what our own potential response to such a development would - or, in this case, will - be.

We, as a people, have a tendency to be . . . how do I put this? . . . rather oblivious. By which I mean it is far easier for us to ignore things, preferring to live in a fantasy world of our own construction at the expense of approaching the world as it is. We insist that the world, and the other people in it, behave according to our preconceived notions and ideas, and we are invariably left at a loss when that doesn't happen.

What concerns me about the Chinese desire to field aircraft carriers are the following statements made by that officer in the article: "Navies of great powers with more than 10 aircraft carrier battle groups with strategic military objectives have a different purpose from countries with only one or two carriers used for offshore defense," he said, apparently in reference to the United States which has 11, according to the FT.

"Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country we will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach."

Well, that and the fact that many of us, in our delightful naivete, are going to accept that at face value.

First of all, B.S. and other choice words in response to those two sentences. Look, folks, the whole point behind an aircraft carrier is power projection and the ability to control the seas, the airspace over it, and to a large extent, the lands bordering the seas. Period. The fact that aircraft carriers are mobile means that you can project that power at a great distance from your own shores . . .

Starting to get the idea? The only reason you build an aircraft carrier is to give your Navy a global reach. What you don't do is use them for coastal defence, which is what the Chinese official is saying a PLA(N) carrier - or carriers, because they're like potato chips, you can't build just one - would be used for. Land-based aircraft, for example, are just as effective in that role, and you can't sink a land-based airfield.

The PRC is not a "great" maritime nation, at least not in the same way that, say, the United States or the United Kingdom are considered to be maritime nations. Neither their trade nor their economy depend on sea-borne trade quite the same way, nor does their inherent security position require or demand the power-projection capability inherent in a carrier strike group. Unless, of course, they are planning on getting in on that business . . .

Therein lies the rub. Aircraft carriers are expensive, both to build and to operate, and they are pretty unnecessary if the intent is coastal defence. They are, however, indispensable if you plan on transforming yourself from a regional to a global power.

It is interesting, and no accident, that the Chinese official in the article classifies the PRC as a great power, and there is a message in that for us. One that we would be foolish to ignore. China is announcing its intentions, if we care to listen.

The PRC already claims the oceans around it as its own. We're not talking the traditional concept of territorial waters here, or even of the recognized 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. The PRC claims all the waters, as far east as the Philippines and as far south as Indochina, as their "territorial" waters. What they lack, at the moment, is a true blue-water capability to enforce those claims. Fielding aircraft carriers, and the escort vessels needed to support them, gives the Chinese that ability.

Not to mention the issue of Taiwan. If the PRC were ever tempted to resort to a military option to solve that issue, the only real response the U.S. could opt for would be a naval one. A fleet centered on aircraft carriers gives the PRC the ability to counter that, at a distance from the island, or at least make it a very bloody endeavour.

Nor is the timing of this interview a coincidence. A new Administration is going to take power this January, under a President who has absolutely no experience in foreign affairs. Furthermore, President Obama has also been a proponent of further "downsizing" the American military. Now, before the hysteria starts, let's be clear on this issue. There are aspects of the defence establishment that he has said he is in favour of strengthening; the SOF capability, for one, comes to mind. On the other hand, he has stated that he is also in favour of significantly cutting back or eliminating things like the F-22, BMD, and the Army's FCS. Those issues, though, are really a subject for another time. What is of significance to this discussion, however, is that the President-elect has also stated that he is in favour of cutting the Navy by at least one, if not more, carrier strike group.

Which would be incredibly short-sighted and foolish, especially in light of the Chinese desire to field carriers. The only option we have to project power and presence in the Western Pacific, and for that matter the Indian Ocean, is our carrier force. A force that, given our current committments and operational demands, is already stretched thin at eleven groups.

So what happens when the PRC fields a carrier force, and if we decide to go ahead and decommission a hull or two? Is it really in our interests to cede control of the Western Pacific to China? That is the question we should be asking, for the implications of that have ramifications for the continued security of not only ourselves, but for such places as the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan.

Change is coming, all right. Whether we choose to believe in it or not. But is it going to be the kind of change that we are really prepared for?