There used to be a time, not so long ago, when the United States Navy was a "blue water" force - that is, a force which could conduct sustained operations in force in the deep oceans, out of sight of land. Those days, however, seem to be rapidly coming to an end.
It is true that the Navy currently continues to engage in blue-water operations, and does so quite well; to the point, in fact, or remaining the premiere naval force in the world. So, what am I talking about when I say those days are coming to an end?
Simply this. Within the next twenty years, the Navy will lose that ability.
It used to be that the Navy was a well-balanced force, designed to exercise the concept of sea control. The force was a mix of CV/CVNs, CG/CGNs, DD/DDGs, FF/FFGs and SSNs that had the capability to secure the seas for the use of ourselves, our allies and neutrals, while denying the seas to any potential enemy. The number of platforms available was not the only determining factor in our ability to carry out this mission; the over-all balance and mix of platforms also played a key role. And it is the latter that we are rapidly giving up.
With the imminent retirement of USS Kitty Hawk, the last of the conventionally-powered CVs will be leaving the Fleet, leaving us with the nuclear-powered Enterprise and the Nimitz-class CVNs. Yet Enterprise, too, as well as the first ships of the Nimitz-class, are nearing the ends of their service lives. The plan is to replace them, an eventually all of the Nimitz-class, with units of the CVN-21 next-generation aircraft carriers, but the costs of the new platforms are going to prohibit that on a one-for-one basis.
In other words, we're going to worsen an already bad situation in which fewer platforms are going to be expected to maintain the same levels of operational commitments. Look at it this way: in the 1980, we had the ability to form 15 CVBGs (Carrier Battlegroups), which could support the deployment of 12 CVBGs at one time. At present, we have 11 CVBGs, which can support the deployment of 8. As Enterprise and the early Nimitz-class ships leave the Fleet, to be replaced by a smaller number of CVN-21 follow-ons, those numbers are going to get worse. Fewer ships mean longer deployments and more stress on both ships and crews (as well as on the families of the crews), and fewer assets to cover commitments.
The same situation exists in the submarine community. All of the pre-Los Angeles-class SSNs have been withdrawn from service. And the early units of that class will likewise soon be leaving service, replaced by the three units of the Seawolf-class and an indeterminate number of Virginia-class SSNs. Again, though, it is highly unlikely that the hulls will be replaced on a one-for-one basis.
All of the cruisers, except for the Ticonderoga-class Aegis ships, are gone now and, in common with the rest of the Fleet, the early ships of the class are already being retired. Some of these ships, like the Virginia-class CGNs, were retired at a time when they still had several decades worth of useful service left, while less-capable ships were retained for a few years until they, too, reached the end of their service lives. In the case of the Virginia-class CGNs, which were only marginally less-capable in the AAW role than the Ticonderoga-class CGs after receiving the NTU (New Threat Upgrade), the reason offered for retiring them was the cost involved in re-coring their reactors, which all four ships were due for. In their place, the two California-class CGNs were retained because they had both been re-cored a few years prior, even though they were less-capable platforms (in terms of both AAW and ASuW capabilities) than the Virginia-class, an far less capable than the Ticonderoga-class. And the Ticonderoga-class, which at heart are nothing more than an improved Spruance-class DD, will also soon be leaving the Fleet in large numbers, with some of the early units already having been withdrawn.
Likewise, all of the destroyers are gone now, with the exception of the Arleigh Burke-class DDGs. All 31 of the Spruance-class were retired early, as were the four ships of the Kidd-class DDG variant. Every other DD/DDG class have long been retired. The FF/FFG force has been similarly savaged, with every class save the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFGs gone (despite the fact that the Knox-class FFs were more-capable platforms in the ASW role). Even so, many of those ships are also starting to retire, and there have been proposals to strip the remaining platforms of their gun armament.
There are plans, of course, for new shipbuilding, but those plans are not, and will not be, sufficient to either stem or reverse the decline in the Navy's number of platforms or its ability to exercise blue-water operations. Part of that has to do with costs, and part of it has to do with our own short-sightedness.
Take, for example, the LCS, or Littoral Combat Ship. At best, this platform is some sort of hybridized cross between a Frigate and a Destroyer, a sort of Super Frigate, if you will. Since the late 1990s, the Navy has increasingly been focusing on littoral warfare, or operating ships in a high-threat environment close to shore and in shallow waters. There is, indeed, a need for that capability, but at the same time, the Navy doesn't want to risk high-value ships in that role. That was one of the driving forces behind the idea of the LCS.
The problem is, the LCS will be able to function effectively as neither a Frigate nor a Destroyer. In theory, it is to be a "mission modular" ship, capable of performing such missions as ASW, ASuW, mine warfare, maritime intercept, intelligence and surveillance operations, anti-terrorist operations, logistics support and special warfare support, simply by swapping out the required modules. In short, it is intended to be all ships for all things. But if history has shown us anything, it is that something that tries to be good at everything winds up being competent at nothing.
Another problem with the LCS is its cost. Remember, this is a platform that was intended to be a low-cost alternative for use in a high-threat environment. Originally, the unit-cost of each platform was set at $220 million dollars, but that has long since been superceded. Currently, unit-cost for an LCS has risen to $500 million dollars. This has prompted the Navy, which originally planned to acquire six ships by the end of this year, to reduce that initial order to just two ships. It has also prompted both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to slash the funding for the requisite "mission modules," which in turn threatens the ability of the platform to perform its intended missions. Thus, the entire programme is in danger of failing before the Navy has even accepted the first hull for service.
The problem gets even more insidious when you consider that the LCS was also intended as a compliment to the DD(X) and CG(X) programmes. DD(X) is a reworking of the failed DD-21 programme, and is intended as the replacement for the Arleigh Burke DDGs. The original plan was to procure 32 units of the DD(X) class, which is still a smaller number than the total of the Arleigh Burke-class units. Unit costs, however, have reduced that target to a total of just 7 ships. And remember, once the Arleigh Burkes are gone, there will be no other Destroyers except for the DD(X). Seven ships hardly seems like an adequate replacement for a class of over 50. Even that target may prove to be unobtainable, with each unit of the DD(X) class costing almost $3 billion dollars.
In terms of Cruisers, the current idea is to replace the Ticonderoga-class with the CG(X). This next-generation ship is essentially just an enlarged version of the DD(X), on a hull of 25,000 tons as opposed to the 14,000 tons of the Destroyer version. Like DD(X), CG(X) is a reworked version of the failed CG-21 programme, and the plan is to build 19 of the ships (vice the 27 ships of the Ticonderoga-class).
Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the design plans and specifications were stolen by the Chinese several years ago, the major problem with CG(X) is again going to be costs. At nearly twice the size of DD(X), each unit is certainly going to cost significantly more than those vessels. If that is indeed the case, then it is almost certain that the target of 19 ships is going to be fiscally impossible to achieve, and procurement will have to be scaled back drastically.
So we come back full-circle to where we started, facing a situation in which the Navy will soon be expected to maintain its committments and operations with fewer assets available to do so. As the number of platforms declines, our ability to exercise either blue-water or littoral operations will also inevitably decline, and that is a very dangerous position for us to find ourselves in. We must remember that we are a maritime nation; the health and vitality of our economy depends on our free movement over and use of the seas. We must consider what the potential consequences will be if we allow the Navy to be reduced to what amounts to a barely adequate coastal defence force.
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