The $135 Million Boondoggle

We're being had. Again.

In the area of, "Wow, that's a cool toy," I'd be one of the first to say that the F-22 Raptor is, well, a cool toy. But such things as the wow factor and gee-whiz technology aside, it's a toy that we don't particularly need - or afford, for that matter.

I can't help but wonder just what the purpose of the F-22 is. Certainly, the mission it was conceived and designed to fulfill is widely touted by both the DoD and Lockheed-Martin, the contractor: air superiority. But against whom, exactly?

Consider this. The F-22 arose out of a 1981 requirement issued by the DoD for an advanced follow-on stealth design to the F-117, and as a replacement for the F-15 in anticipation of the emergence of Soviet fifth-generation designs. At the time the programme was formalized in 1986, it was envisioned that a total force of some 800 F-22s would be required in the face of what the Soviets were likely to bring to the table. But a funny thing happened by 1991, when the first Raptors began flight-test . . . the Soviet Union collapsed. Not only that, but the design-generation the F-22 was meant to face by and large failed to materialize, and still hasn't.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the intended production numbers for the F-22 were scaled back from around 800 aircraft to 600 or so aircraft. That was in 1997. By 2003, the production numbers had been reduced again, this time to around 400 aircraft. Not too long ago, the contracts were revised yet again, this time finalizing the production run at a mere 187 aircraft.

Now, this should concern all of us, for a couple of reasons. First and foremost is cost. The F-22 was already a hideously expensive aircraft to begin with, but there's something else that we all have to remember. A basic law of the marketplace is that the more you build of something, the cheaper each individual unit is in terms of cost. On a per-unit basis, 800 F-22s are less expensive than 400, or 187. So as production numbers went down, individual unit cost went up, until we arrived at an aircraft that costs a little over $135 million per aircraft.

Here's a comparison for you. For each F-22 we buy, we could buy four F-15s. Which, by the way, is still a perfectly capable air-superiority platform in the face of current threats, and certainly more useful than the F-22 in the kind of war we find ourselves currently fighting and likely to fight in the foreseeable future. But why is that important? Because of this.

Since 1991, we have been happily hacking away at our military capabilities; overall, the DoD has shrunk by over half, funding is tight, and its unlikely to get any better. Problem is, none of our military committments has shrunk and, on top of that, we're also now fighting two on-going wars. We keep going to the well, but the well is running dry. The Air Force, however, is charging full speed into fielding the F-22, knowing as it does so that it is going to have to give something up in order to do that.

In other words, it's force of F-15s and F-16s.

For every F-22 that is fielded, four F-15s are going to have to be withdrawn from service. It's already being done; the F-15As, Bs, Cs and Ds are already being stood down, leaving only the F-15E models, which were the strike variant - and which now also have to double in the air superiority role. Fewer aircraft to do more jobs . . . terrific.

Look at it this way. After the end of the Cold War, one of the Air Force missions that took one of the biggest hits was - you guessed it - Continental Air Defence. In other words, the air superiority mission. In 1990, the Air Force had twelve air groups that it used to control and defend the air space of the United States. By the time 9/11 rolled around, the north-east sector of NORAD could generate exactly four aircraft from two widely-separated bases in order to provide an immediate response to the threat. That wasn't an accident; it was a direct result of the force draw-down and the post-Cold War funding priorities.

Now the DoD, the Air Force and Lockheed-Martin want us to believe they can take a force of 187 F-22s and provide not only air-defence of the country, but also overseas theatre-level air superiority and strike, all at the same time. Yeah. And I've got a bridge in Brooklyn that I'd like to sell them. They're really hoping that no one will notice but, in addition to the appropriations for the planned 187 Raptors, the Air Force is now also asking for a further $62 billion to be "held in reserve," just in case they might have to buy a few more F-22s.

The really stunning thing in all of this is that, by continually reducing the planned number of purchases, the DoD and the Air Force have all but admitted that the F-22 is an aircraft without a mission. And after a design-cycle that has lasted for twenty-seven years, we're left with a boondoggle that costs $135 million each. I'm all for advancing the technology, but at this point, this thing has become a sinkhole at a time when we really can't afford it. Worse yet, in order to fund this programme, we're throwing away technologies and capabilities that are still perfectly viable in the current and foreseeable threat environment. The most insidious thing is that we keep insisting on trying to do more with less, and that almost never works.

Anyone else remember the Maginot Line?